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on the basis of income, 28 three tax income if it yields more than an alterna-
tive tax,25
 and four, like Massachusetts, employ an income tax as well as
other forms of franchise tax." Straight taxation of income alone is probably
the simplest method of corporate taxation and also the most equitable, all
other things being equal. In Massachusetts, however, things are something
less than equal. Large amounts of corporate property are exempt from local
taxation. Therefore, if they are not taxed by the state government, they
will escape taxation altogether. Their inclusion within the purview of the
corporate excise tax is a fiscal necessity.
In conclusion, the Massachusetts General Court has taken a step in the
right direction both as to simplifying and equalizing the tax laws and as to
providing an investment incentive. It is a step that could well be emulated
by her sister states.
JOHN M. TOBIN
TRADE REGULATON
Congress has recently enacted the Antitrust Civil Process Act' which
enables the Department of Justice to obtain compulsory production of
documentary evidence in civil antitrust investigations. The act thus places
the Department on a parity with other federal agencies which have the power
to obtain documents for purposes of investigation.2 This seems eminently
desirable since the Department is the primary enforcer of the antitrust laws.
Nonetheless, similar proposals had been submitted, without success, to
Congress for the last four years. 3
Prior to this enactment, the Department had three methods to obtain
evidence in civil antitrust investigations, all of which were generally un-
satisfactory and inherently unenforceable. 4 First, voluntary cooperation of
prospective defendants could be sought. This procedure is subject to obvious
defects and needs no extended discussion, suffice it to say that there were
many instances where cooperation was not forthcoming.' As the applicable
House Report points out, "this method . . . is unsatisfactory since it leaves
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota and Wisconsin.
21) Connecticut, New York and Utah.
30 Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
1 Pub. L. No. 87-664, 76 Stat. 546 (1962) ; 15 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3095
(1962).
2 A partial list of such agencies is contained in H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962). They include the Departments of Agriculture, the Army, Labor,
Treasury, as well as the Veterans Administration and the Federal Maritime Commission.
3 For a legislative history of these proposals, see H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 2.
4 Dissatisfaction with the evidence producing powers of the Department was the
main topic of the Hearing on Current Antitrust Laws, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Anti-
trust Rep. 345 (1955). For additional discussion concerning the previous inadequacies
of civil antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice, see H.R. Rep. No. 2966,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1956), cited in 59 Colum. L. Rev. 1089 (1959); 19 Md. L.
Rev. 326 (1959).
5 See Hearings on S. 167 Before Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust & Monopoly,
87th Cong., lst Sess. (1961) (remarks of Asst. Att'y Gen. Loevinger).
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the public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws subject to the
will of those who violate the laws."
Second, pursuant to 'Section 6(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act'
the Commission, upon petition of the Attorney General, may conduct in-
vestigations in certain instances and transmit all findings and recommenda-
tions to the Department. However, this procedure is very limited; it applies
only when a final decree has been entered in a government action to enjoin
a violation of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, only corporations are subject
to this method, whereas the new act applies to partnerships and associations
as well. The House Report categorically states that this procedure has never
been used in aid of an investigation. 8
Third, the Department could bring suit based on all available evidence
and then invoke the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to obtain evidence unavailable prior to commencement of the suit.
This method places the cart before the horse since the purpose of an in-
vestigation is to determine whether suit should be brought in the first place.
Similarly, evidence could be obtained by use of the grand jury subpoena, but
this method was curtailed when the Supreme Court held it to be an abuse
of process to instigate a grand jury investigation where there is no intent
to bring a criminal action .° While the lack of such intent may be difficult
to prove, such affords no reason for "flouting the policy of the law.""
Whenever the Attorney General "has reason to believe that any person
under investigation may be in possession of any documentary material rele-
vant to a civil antitrust investigation," he may, prior to commencement of
a civil or criminal action, make written demand for production of such
material." A "person" is "any corporation, association, partnership or other
legal entity not a natural person."' 2 The act provides the recipient of the
demand with adequate safeguards against possible abuse of process by the
Department. Section 3 (b) (1) requires that each demand "state the nature
of the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation which is under
investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto." The documents
to be produced must be described, according to section 3(b) (2), "with such
definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified."
A reasonable time for production must be allowed," and the custodian to
whom the documents are to be made available must be identified." Any
requirement which would be unreasonable, or any document which would
be privileged, if demanded by a subpoena duces tecum in aid of a federal
grand jury investigation is outside the scope of the act."
O H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 2.
7 38 Stat. 721 (1414), 15 U.S.C. 46 (1958).
H.R. Rep. 1386, supra note 2. One reason for this development was the internal
friction in the FTC over its use because of the large drain it would create on the
Commission's budget and manpower. See 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. If 8590 (1962).
O United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958),
10 Id. at 683.
11 Section 3 (a) .
12 Section 2(f),
13 Section 3(b) (3).
1 1 Section 3 (b) (4).
Sections 3(c) (1) & (2).
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The act also imposes some restrictions as to the extent that the docu-
mentary materials may be used and examined by other governmental agencies.
They can be examined only by duly authorized members of the Justice
Department," and such information cannot be given to the FTC for it
to conduct its own investigation on the matter. 17
 However, the Department
is authorized under section 4(d) to use these documents in any court or
grand jury proceeding involving an alleged antitrust violation. Furthermore,
the act does not affect the Department's power to lay evidence obtained by
the demand before a grand jury or any power with respect to such proceed-
ing. is
Enforcement of any demand, in the event voluntary compliance is not
forthcoming, is left to the district courts where the "person" resides, con-
ducts its principal place of business or, if the parties agree, transacts busi-
ness." Similarly, under Section 5 (b), any "person" served with a demand
may challenge its validity in the district courts. The federal courts have full
authority to enter any order which may be necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of the act, 2° disobedience being punishable by contempt?' In addition,
criminal penalties are provided for any natural person who, with the intent
to evade any demand made pursuant to the act, conceals or destroys any
document which is the subject of the demand. 22
An unusual aspect of the act is the creation of the office of Antitrust
Document Custodian.23 The Custodian is made responsible for the use to
which documents under his care are put, 24 but, unlike the Federal Trade
Commission Act,25 for example, no specific sanctions are provided for viola-
tions. He may deliver documents to any attorney acting on behalf of the
United States in an antitrust proceeding. 2° Upon termination of such pro-
ceeding, however, any material not under the control of a court or grand
jury must be returned to the Custodian. 27 If, after a reasonable time for
inspection of these documents has elapsed, no antitrust proceeding has been
instituted, the person who produced the documents is entitled to their return
upon written demand made to the Attorney General or to the head of the
Antitrust Division 28
Thus far the background which gave rise to the need for the act and,
in general terms, the act itself have been examined. Attention is now directed
to specific problems likely to arise under the act and the law applicable
thereto.
16 Section 4(c). However, see note 26 infra,
17 The bill as originally introduced in Congress and passed by the Senate would
have provided otherwise. For the full text of this bill, see H.R. Rep. No. 2291, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
18 Section 7.
10 Section 5(a).
20 Section 5 (d).
21 Ibid.
22 Section 6(a), thereby amending 18 U.S.C. 1505 (1958).
23 Section 4(a).
24 Section 4(c).






Despite early decisions to the contrary,29
 there is presently no require-
ment that a demand for production of documentary material, to be enforce-
able, must be based on a showing of probable violation of a law. "It is
enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within
the power of Congress to command." 3° This view is reflected in the provisions
of the act itself. A demand may be made whenever there is reason to believe
that a "person" has documents which are "relevant to a civil antitrust
investigation."31
 An "antitrust investigation" is "any inquiry . . for the
purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in any
antitrust violation." 33
 Obviously then, the statute does not require a showing
of probable cause since the whole purpose of the act is to aid the Depart-
ment in ascertaining whether the law has been violated. Clearly, this is well
within the scope of the modern decisions."
Section 3(c) (1) of the act provides that no demand shall "contain
any requirement which would be held to be unreasonable if contained in a
subpoena duces tecum . in aid of a grand jury investigation. . . ." It is
important to note, however, that a grand jury "can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assur-
ance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated
by statute to any administrative body, it too may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law." 34
In Hale v. Henkel35
 it was stated that a subpoena duces tecum which
contains a sweeping demand for documentary material, with no showing of
necessity or materiality to justify such demand, "is equally indefensible as
a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms." 3° In Brown v. United
States the Court, without overruling Henkel, indicated that a showing of
"probable materiality" was sufficient.37 More recently, the Court has stated
that "law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves
that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 3 s
Moreover, a demand for information will be sustained even if prompted by
"official curiosity" so long as it is not "of such a sweeping nature and so
unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory
power."3° Compare the language of Mr. Justice Holmes: "It is contrary to
29 See, e.g., FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886 (I), Md. 1922), aff'd per
curiam, 267 U.S. 586 (1924), holding that Congress could not confer upon the FTC
power to compel production of documents in aid of a general investigation where
there is no showing of a probable violation of law. See also, Harriman v. ICC, 211
U.S. 407 (1908) ; Davis, Administrative Law § 3.04 (1958).
38 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). Compare the
quoted language with the Baltimore Grain case, supra note 29.
31
 Section 3 (a).
32 Section 2(c).
33 See, e.g., the Walling case, supra note 30; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632 (1950) ; Davis, op. cit. supra note 29, §§ 3.04, 3.06.
31
 United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 30, at 642.
35
 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
36
 Id. at 77.
276 U.S. 134, 143 (1927).
38
 United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 30, at 652.
38 Ibid.
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the first principles of justice to allow a search through all the respondent's
records, relevant and irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up. ))40
Section 3(c) (2) provides that no demand shall "require the production
of any documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if
demanded by a subpoena duces tecum . . . in aid of a grand jury investiga-
tion. . . ." With respect to the privilege against self incrimination, it is not
clear what exclusionary effect, if any this provision will have. The subpoena
provisions of the act apply to "any corporation, association, partnership, or
other legal entity not a natural person."' It has long been held that this
privilege does not apply to corporations, 42 and that an individual in posses-
sion of corporate records may not claim the privilege as if they were his
own private property. 4" In United States v. White44
 it was held that an
officer of an unincorporated labor union may not claim the privilege with
respect to production of union records in his possession even though they
might tend to incriminate him. "[I] ndividuals, when acting as representatives
of a collective group, cannot be said to be excercising their personal rights
and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. . . . And
the official records and documents ... that are held by them in a repre-
sentative rather than a personal capacity cannot be the subject of the
personal privilege against self incrimination." 45
 Whether this reasoning will
apply to partnerships and other such arrangements remains to be seen."
With respect to other privileges, not personal in nature, there seems to be
no reason why the act should not be effective.
The result of the Antitrust Civil Process Act is to extend to the Depart-
ment of Justice a weapon with which it can now procure documentary evi-
dence for investigative purposes—a weapon which has been enjoyed by the
Federal Trade Commission and many other governmental agencies over the
past years. This new legislation should enable the Department to proceed




 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 298 U.S. 298, 306 (1924). See Note, Resisting
Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 69 Yale L.J. 131 (1959).
41 Section 2(f).
42
 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 35; Brown v. United States, supra note 37; Wilson
v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
43 Wilson v. United States, supra note 42.
44 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
45
 Id. at 699.
40 For an affirmative answer, see Davis, op. cit. supra note 29, § 3.07.
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